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RECENT CASE NOTES
of the principal case was reached, and the material determined to be garbage. The court there said, "While an ordinance, such as this under consideration is to be strictly construed, it is nevertheless to be construed
according to the fair and usual meaning of its language in the light of
the purpose of its enactment. If such material as is here shown to be
collected is not garbage, bones, and kitchen refuse (st. provision), it is
difficult to understand what it is. Unquestionably, the word 'garbage'
involves rejection for all purposes. It has been rejected as food. It is
more or less mingled, so that it is objectionable to human sensibilities, as
well as unfit for human consumption. The court is not unmindful of the
fact that refuse of the kind is usually noisome and disgusting, both in
appearance and odor, and that the word 'garbage' carries to the ordinary
mind the idea of filth; but if refuse of this character is not held to be
garbage until fermentation sets in, then the very object of the ordinance
would be defeated, and a reasonable and proper precaution in the interests
of the inhabitants of the city brought to naught. Who could say when
fermentation to an objectionable extent took place."
If, in the principal case, the statutory definition of garbage had been
construed according to the fair and usual meaning of its language in the
light of the purpose of its enactment, it is a logical conclusion that the
material in question here would be encompassed as garbage. There was a
rejection for human consumption, materials subject to rapid fermentation,
a potential danger to social interests and welfare, in fact, all of the dangers of the situation that prompt the enactment of such statutes are
present.
The mere fact that it works an individual hardship or that in a particular case, no nuisance or danger exists due to sanitary methods should
not outweigh the considerations which motivated the passage of the statute,
namely, that there is a social interest in the preservation of public health;
that all people who gather such materials as constitute garbage are not
sanitary in their methods, thereby endangering the health of the inhabitants of the city, and that it is easier to observe sanitation through one
agency than by supervision and restriction of many individual agents or
property owners. The material in question in this decision is free from
the restriction placed on garbage, and remains a source of dissemination
of disease. The effect, therefore, is not that of refusal to extend the statutory definition of garbage, but rather to place a limitation on it.
The court announced a rule of law in regard to regulation of garbage
disposal that is sound both on principle and authority; but after doing so,
in the light of the authorities cited, it seems that it placed too narrow
an interpretation on the statutory definition of garbage, thereby in effect
nullifying the very rule it announced. The rejected food materials from
restaurant kitchens present a greater danger from nuisance and injury
to the public health, due to the quantity of the material and the large
number of people who pass in the vicinity of the restaurants, than does
the waste material to which the court limited the term garbage. H. N. F.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMIT-The action
was brought to enjoin the school town, its trustees, and Oakland City
School Realty Co. from performing a lease contract. The appellants con-
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tend that the obligations place an indebtedness beyond the limit of 2 per
cent of the taxable property thereof as contained in Sec. 1, Art. 13 of the
Constitution. The contract as set out followed the Statutes of 1929 Supplement, Sec. 6867.1-6867.3 providing for the leasing of school houses. Here
the lease was to be in force for 30 years at an annual rental not to exceed
10 per cent of the value of the cost of the building and the real estate, and
the school city was to pay all taxes, water rent, insurance, etc. The annual
payments were to be $8,000 for first three years, $9,000 for the next three
years and $10,000 per annum for the remaining twenty-four years. There
was a demurrer to the complaint that was overruled and then a general
denial filed. On hearing the evidence the lower court directed a verdict
for appellees. Appeal was made an alleged error in overruling appellant's
motion for new trial. Held, judgment reversed, not sustained by sufficient
evidence. Bryant v. School Town of Oakland City, May 22, 1930. Sup.
Ct. of Ind, 171 N. E. 378.
The Supreme Court in its disposal of the case was ruled entirely by
Hively v. School City of Napanee (Ind.), 169 N. E. 51, where a similar
contract was entered into and was called void under the Constitutional
prohibition. There the court ruled the purpose of the contract was a
means of evading the debt limit and the court would look through the
form and look at the substance. State ex rel. Matthews v. Forsythe, 147
Ind. 466, 473, 44 N. E. 593. In similar contracts by municipal corporations
for the purchase of necessities such as water and light the courts have looked
upon them favorably and have upheld them in many instances. Valparaiso
v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1; Crowder v. Sullivan, 128 Ind. 486; Foland v. Frankton, 142 Ind. 546. To construe these contracts as constitutional the Indiana
courts have invoked the doctrine that until the property contracted for has
been actually furnished, although the aggregate would exceed the limit,
there is no indebtedness within the meaning of the Constitution. Brasheer
v. Madison, 142 Ind. 685; Voss v. Waterloo Water Co., 163 Ind. 69. Debt
as defined by the cases is a specified sum which is due or owing from one
person to another and denotes not only the duty of the obligor to pay, but
the right of the creditor to enforce payment. State v. Hawes, 12 Ind. 323;
Laporte v. Gainnewell Fire Alarm Tele. Co., 146 Ind. 466. Essential to
the idea is that an obligation should have arisen which entitles the holder
to receive the money without regard to any contingency within the control
of municipality. Quill v. Indianapolis, 124 Ind. 292.
It is the duty of the School Board to build, buy, or otherwise provide
a school building. Burns Ann. Stat. (1926), Sec. 6795 and 6537. That
the rent was unreasonable might be inferred here since the aggregate of
the rent (if 10 per cent was the figure) would total enough to pay for
the building as well as the interest on the investment. There have been
Indiana cases in respect to contracts for necessities, such as water plants
or light plants, that have been declared void because they place the ultimate indebtedness upon the municipal corporation or it will lose what it
has invested. Eddy Valve Co. v. Crouin Point, 166 Ind. 613, 76 N. E. 536.
The contract in the instant case was not set out in all its terms. The
lower court evidently believed it was a true lease contract in which the
payments were due only as rent for the periods covered. Nothing was
mentioned of an option to buy or the terms of such option, if it existed,
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so that it might be shown that a subterfuge was intended. (The statutes
provide for a bona fide option. Burns 1929, 6867.2.) The value of the
proposed building was also omitted leaving it rather doubtful as to the
reasonableness of the so called rent and whether or not more than 6 per
cent was being charged. It might well be a bona fide contract of lease
rather than for purchase from the facts stated.
It seems to be the better view and the weight of authority that a school
district, being a municipal corporation, can make contracts for future payments upon the ground that until consideration has been furnished for
the contract to pay rent there is no indebtedness, rather than the theory
that the indebtedness is created at once and time of payment is postponed.
1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.), Sec. 196. Thus if the contract in the present case could fairly be construed as a bona fide lease, at
a reasonable rental, there would be no objection to it on constitutional
grounds if the annual rent did not carry the indebtedness beyond the constitutional limit. City of South Bend v. Reynolds, 155 Ind. 70, 57 N. E. 706.
R. R. D.
NEGLIGENCr--DUTY TO TREsPASSERs-DUTY TO WARN KNOWN TRESPASSER-The defendant, a nursery contractor, was on the land of Farris
removing a large elm tree. Several children observed the contractor's work
and were warned that they must stay away and were driven away by defendant and his assistants several times. When the tree was about to fall,
the defendant cut the last root off and, without a warning, the tree fell upon
plaintiff, a child, who was severely injured. Plaintiff alleges negligence for
failure to warn that the tree was about to fall. The defendant defends saying plaintiff was a trespasser and was contributorily negligent. Lower court
gave verdict for defendant on ground that plaintiff was a trespasser, but admitted defendant's negligence. Defendant released from damages on theory
that defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff because he was a trespasser.
Plaintiff appeals. Held, for plaintiff on grounds that defendant owed duty
to warn even a trespasser of any acts of defendant which would increase
his peril. Mourton v. Poulter (1930), 2 K. B. 183, 99 L. J. K. 289.
One who is upon the land of another by express or implied invitation to
do work which will benefit both the land owner and the party doing the
work is as a matter of law an invitee. Thistlewaite v. Heck, 75 Ind. App.
359, 128 N. E. 611; Bennett v. The R. R., 102 U. S. 577; 1 Thompson on
Negligence, 968 et seq. To the invitee the land owner owes a duty of
protection and he is in charge of the invitee's safety while .on the premises.
Indiana, Bloomington and Western Railroad Co. v. Barnhart, 115
Ind. 393, 16 N. E. 121.
The invitee who is on the land of another by his express permission in
the form of an invitation and on which invitee is maintaining instrumentalities, owes no greater duty of due care to one upon the land, whether
rightfully or wrongfully, than the owner of the land. The one using the
land of X owes no more duty to a wrongdoer on the land than the owner
of the lot would owe so long as the users' use is rightful. Cumberland
Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. Martin, 116 Ky. 554, 76 S. W. 394. But
see Quinn v. Telephone Co., 72 N. J. Law 276, 62 A 412.

